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The aim of this study is to examine the impact of board characteristics on financial distress 
companies. Specifically this study examines board attributes (size of board, percentage of inside 
directors, CEO is founder, CEO is chairman and CEO duality) and its relation with companies 
that experienced financial distress after controlling for leverage, market return, lagged of market 
return, and GDP growth. Compared with previous studies in Malaysia, this study uses PN17 
criterion to select the sample and that is defines as the shareholder’s equity is less than 25% of 
issued and paid-up capital of a firm. Using a data from 2004 to 2009, the results show size and 
CEO-founder are negatively significantly related to distress while CEO duality and fraction of 
independent director affect distress positively. This study could be used to measure the 
effectiveness of The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). This study is also 
useful to directors, investors and authorities who would want to know which corporate 
governance factors explain distress.  
  
Keywords: Financial distress, Corporate governance, Board structure, Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance. 
 
Received: 8/5/2017 Revise: 15/2/2018 Accepted: 28/2/2018 Publish: 29/3/2018 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, the number of high-profile scandals involving abuse of corporate power and 
alleged criminal activity by corporate officers has risen and as a result, the issue of corporate 
governance has received increased attention. The abuse of corporate power comes about as a 
result of a company not adhering to good corporate governance. Normally, those companies with 
bad corporate governance are the ones that will be in trouble, hence be forced into bankruptcy. 
Seeing the importance of corporate governance, government of Malaysia has introduced the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in the year 2000 which provides principles 
that the company must adhere to while running their operations. In essence, it refers to the rules, 
processes, or laws by which businesses are operated, regulated, and controlled. This is in line 
with Wruck (1990) who found that corporate governance factor is one of the factors that lead the 
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company into distress. Taking this into consideration, this study examines the board structures of 
companies and their relationship with financial distress. 
 
Recent studies have shown the importance of board structure in explaining the success or decline 
of a company (Md-Rus et al., 2013; Daily, Dalton, & Canella, 2003). One of the most important 
characteristics of board structure is its independence. Securities Commission of Malaysia has 
highlighted the importance of board independence and made it as its first principle in all of its 
corporate governance code; Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2000 (MCCG, 2000) with 
revisions in 2007 and 2012. It is expected that a blend between independent and non-independent 
directors would provide check and balance mechanism in monitoring managerial actions. 
However, there is inconclusive evidence to support the association of director independence in 
explaining financial distress. For example,  Daily and Dalton (1994) show that bankrupt firms 
were characterized by greater number of independent directors while Abdullah (2006) find that 
independent directors is not significant in explaining a company’s distress condition. Elloumi and 
Gueyie (2001) and Platt and Platt (2012) support the idea that the presence of independent 
directors is positively related to companies financial health as they are more willing to use their 
power  to monitor and discipline the managers. Likewise, there are inconclusive evidences to 
support that board size affect performance (Fama and Jensen, 1989; Chaganti et al., 1985; Platt 
and Platt, 2012). Larger board size leads to a greater pooling of experience and expertise and 
should lead to better performance. However, smaller board leads to faster decision making. In 
distressed firms, faster decision making is very important. Hence it is important to study whether 
in Malaysian context, board size and percentage of independent and non-independent directors do 
matter in distressed company. 
 
Another question that arises is whether combining the roles of CEO and chairman, or CEO 
duality, leads to distress. Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (2001) made a recommendation 
that public listed companies separate the functions of CEO and chairman. This recommendation 
is important as many studies have found that CEO duality weakens the balance of powers at the 
top management (Fama and Jensen, 1983), reduces the monitoring by the board of directors over 
the CEO and leads to worse performance (Dayton, 1984; White and Ingrassia, 1992), which 
ultimately lead to a higher probability of distress. Hence, it is important to understand the 
relationship between CEO duality and financial distress.  
 
Many companies are managed by their founders who also act as CEOs. There are studies that 
show companies which are led by founder-CEOs would have lower performance than those led 
by non-founder-CEOs. This happens because large and complex business corporations would 
require a specific type of managerial skill and that may not be readily available for founder-CEO 
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(Willard, Krueger, and Feeser, 1992) and also because of the mismatch in managerial 
competence and the requirements of a changing environment (Daily and Dalton, 1993; 
Jayaraman et al., 2000). Hence, it is important to study whether CEO-founder is a factor that 
leads to distress. 
 
Recognizing the importance of these factors to maintain the sustainability of companies, the 
objective of the study is to examine how board characteristics (size of the board, percentage of 
independent, percentage of executive directors, percentage of non-independent non-executive 
directors, CEO duality, CEO-founder) are related to the probability of companies’ experiencing 
distress.  
  
This study has policy implications related to corporate governance. MCCG comes up with a list 
of good governance practices. It is expected that companies which adopt the practices will have 
lower probability of being in financial distress. Thus, this study could be used to measure the 
effectiveness of MCCG especially on the percentages of independent directors serving on board. 
This study is also useful to directors and investors. From this study, the directors can identify 
factors that explain distress and evaluate the existence of these factors in their companies. 
Investors can use this study to predict corporate distress and stay away from investing in firms 
that are more likely to experience distress.   
 
Finally, this study uses a different approach from previous study where this study define distress 
similarly as one of the criteria used in PN17 where distress is identified when the shareholders 
fund to issued and paid-up capital of a firm is less than 25%. Furthermore, this study uses a 
sample from 2004 to 2009. Most of the previous study identifies the sample based on Asian 
Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997. Thus this study uses sample after AFC but still reflects global 
financial crisis of 2008.   
The study is limited to examine the effect of corporate governance in predicting financial distress 
for a period of six years (from 2004 to 2009). It only focuses on examining the effect of board 
structures on the probability of distress.  
 
    Review of Literature    
Independent director 
Daily and Dalton (1994) and Hambrick and d’Aveni (1998) have found evidence that the number 
of independent directors are related to financial distress. In essence, Daily and Dalton (1994) find 
that the percentage of insider directors on board of directors (BOD) is higher and the proportion 
of independent directors and bankruptcy are negatively and significantly related. In addition, 
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Hambrick and d’Aveni (1998) find that there is a decrease in the number of outside director in 
the years preceding a bankruptcy filing. Judge and Zeithaml (1992) argue that a higher proportion 
of insiders on a board would lead to a lack of involvement in strategic decision making which 
will jeopardizes the company’s future. Eloumi and Gueyie (2001) support the view that 
independent outside directors is a key factor in enhancing a firm’s financial conditions as they are 
more willing to use their powers to monitor and discipline the managers. Li, Wang and Deng 
(2008) find that listed Chinese firms that have higher proportion of independent directors would 
less likely experience financial distress as compared to those firms with lower proportion of 
independent directors. These results support the monitoring role of independent directors. 
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find that poorly performing firms tend to remove insiders and add 
outsiders to run their company. According to them, a greater proportion of outside director tends 
to take actions in line with shareholders interest and can make better acquisition related activities. 
Using mean comparison, Platt and Platt (2012) show that the number of independent directors on 
boards is positively related to the company’s financial health. Parker et al. (2002) find that a 
financially distressed firm that replaced their CEO with an outsider is more likely to experience 
bankruptcy.  
 
On the other hand, Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma (1985) find no significant relationship 
between corporate failure and the proportion of outsiders and insiders. Robinson et al. (2012) also 
find that there is no evidence that the proportion of outside directors is significantly associated 
with the likelihood that a Chapter 11 firm liquidates when they analyze 152 bankruptcy filings of 
publicly traded US firms from 1994 to 2004 using probit regression models. Given the mixed 
relationship between outside directors and financial distress, we hypothesize that there is a 
relationship between independent directors and financial distress and there is a relationship 
between non-independent non-executive directors and financial distress. 
 
Executive directors play a vital role in ensuring business performance. The inclusion of executive 
(inside) directors on the BOD poses contradictory issues. On one hand, their inclusion is 
important and may lead to more effective decision-making process (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Executive directors can effectively assist the CEO to maximise the company’s value by providing 
advice and knowledge about the day-to-day operations. On the other hand, their inclusion invites 
skepticism as to whether they can be independent enough to judge managerial performance. It is 
hypothesized that there is a relationship between the proportion of executive directors on the 





The Cadbury Committee published a code of best practice which recommended the separation of 
functions between Chairman and CEO. The separation is seen as important since the CEO is 
responsible for the daily operations while the Chairman is responsible for monitoring and 
evaluating the performance of executive directors and the CEO (Laing & Weir, 1999). Rechner 
and Dalton (1991) support the idea, stating that combined role frequently lead to decline 
performance while Daily and Dalton (1993) state  that combining the roles is a sign of strong 
CEO power, which may lead to poor performance. Moreover, Rechner and Dalton (1991) argue 
firms that separate the two positions are better facilitated to undertake more effective monitoring 
and control of the CEO than firms that combine the two positions. 
 
 According to agency theory, CEO duality reduced firm performance as it compromises the 
monitoring and control of the CEO (Dayton, 1984) which weaken the balance of powers at the 
top management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). When the two top management posts are held by the 
same person, there is a tendency that the board cannot remove an underperforming CEO (White 
& Ingrassia, 1992) and this action creates an agency cost if the CEO pursues his own interest at 
the cost of the shareholders. As for the distressed companies, Daily and Dalton (1994) and Darrat 
et al. (2010) find that CEO duality is positively related to bankruptcy.  
  
However, Alexander, Fennell and Halpern (1993) argue that when a single person plays the role 
of both the chairman and CEO, it improves firm value as the agency cost between the two is 
eliminated. Under stewardship theory, CEO duality is good for performance as it provides unity 
of command. Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue that CEO duality presents a strong and an 
unambiguous leadership with a unity of command and indicate that firms with CEO duality make 
better and faster decisions as compared to those without CEO duality. Finkelstein and D’Aveni 
(1994) argue that CEO duality helps to avoid confusion between managers, employees and other 
stakeholders because CEO-chairman is the leader who facilitates more timely and more effective 
decision making. Abdul Rahman and Haniffa (2005) argue that the role of CEO duality helps in 
decision making as it permits a sharper focus on company objectives and promotes more rapid 
implementation of operational decisions, hence reduces the probability of distress. Duality also 
helps the CEO in understanding strategic vision to shape the destiny of the company with 
minimum board interference (Dahya, Lonie and Power, 1996).  However, Chaganti et al. (1985) 
find that CEO duality do not have any effect on the probability of financial distress. Based on 






The presence of a founder in the top management indicates stronger insider commitment and it 
implies a continuation or extension of the existing strategy. Founder CEO also helps to prevent 
risks and costs associated with any radical strategic swifts due to leadership change; hence, it 
provides a valuable signal to outside investors about the firm's current and potential value.  
 
Earlier research on the effects of founder–CEOs on operating performances and market 
valuations has produced mixed findings. Morck et al. (1988) find that for older firms, there is a 
negative effect of founding family control on market valuations. For the younger firms in their 
sample, the market value effect of having a member of the founding family as one of the top two 
executives is positive. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) finds that inherited control by a family member is 
associated with a decline in firm performance. In contrast, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) find that 
family control is positively related to performance, and Villalonga and Amit (2006) find a 
positive relation between founder–CEOs and firm performance. Based on the literatures, our 
next hypothesis is that there is a relationship between CEO-founder and financial distress. 
 
Board size 
According to agency theory, larger boards provide effective monitoring by reducing the 
domination of the CEO and hence, improve the performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). CEO needs for advice increases with the complexity of the firm (Anderson et al. 
2004). Larger board size indicates the role of monitoring and advisory (Anderson, Mansi & 
Reeb, 2004) and it provide valuable resources to the firm (Hillman et al., 2000). Larger board 
size is also related to a firm ability to access critical resources and the external environment 
(Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  Moreover, companies with larger board size 
are less likely to fail (Chaganti et al., 1985; Platt & Platt, 2012). 
On the other hand, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) find that small 
board tend to be more effective because it is easier to coordinate. Since small board has greater 
coordination, they are able to make an efficient decision making resulting from better 
communication (Jensen, 1993). As a result, smaller board will exhibit a higher performance 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells, 1998). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that larger board 
normally has problems of social loafing and free riding. However, for bankrupt companies, 
Darrat et al. (2010) find that they are more likely to have small boards of directors compared to 
their solvent counterpart.   
In Malaysia, Gani and Jermias (2006) find that performance is positively and significantly 
related to board size, which indicates that larger board is associated with better decision making 
and monitoring of managers and consequently lead to an increase in firm performance. This 
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result might indicate that larger board size increases the independence of the board and reduces 
the problem of managerial entrenchment (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Yermack (1996) and Ibrahim and Samad (2008) find that performance is negatively and 
significantly related to board size. This result indicates that it is easier to monitor managers with 
small board and small board leads to better decision making. Hence, the mixed findings lead us 
to the next hypothesis which is there is a relationship between board size and financial distress. 
Control variables 
Since the likelihood of distress is influenced by economic circumstances, for example, distress is 
more likely during a recession, economic indicators are used to control for economic influence.  
Similar to previous studies (see for example Shumway, 2001), this study used market return, 
lagged of market return, and GDP growth to represent economic indicators.  These factors need 
to be included in the model to ensure the results are robust. Market return, lagged of market 
return and GDP growth are expected to affect distress negatively as during good times, firms 
have better investment opportunities and could pay-off their debt.   
Financial leverage will lead to financial distress as a firm relies on debt more than equity. This is 
consistent with the results of the studies by Ting (2011) where debt level has negative and 
significant impact on performance where firms with higher debt would have a higher probability 
of default. Debt ratio which is calculated by dividing total debt to total assets provides 
information on a company’s insolvency and its ability to secure additional financing for good 
investment opportunities. This is to ensure that creditors are protected. Ohlson (1980) and 
Mohamed et al. (2001) find that this ratio is significant determinants of corporate failure. 
Another control variable used is profitability where it is measured by net income to total assets. 
Altman (1968) find that profitable companies are less likely to experience distress. 
Methodology 
 
The sample includes all firm listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia. There are two 
different measures of distress that are used by Bursa Malaysia. One is based on a criterion used to 
be included in Practice Notes 17 (PN17) and that is defined as the shareholders equity is less than 
25% of issued and paid-up capital of a firm. The other measure used by Bursa Malaysia before 
the introduction of PN17 is based on a criterion used in Practice Notes 4 (PN4) and that criterion 
is negative shareholders equity. Using the criterion of PN17 would lead to more firms being 
identified as distressed since PN4 firms is a subset of PN17 firms as firms with negative 
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shareholders equity would have less than 25% of issued and paid-up capital. This study will use 
the criterion in PN17.  
The sample period of this study is from 2004 to 2009. A firm must meet the distress criterion 
during this period to be identified as a distressed firm. A total of 589 observations for distressed 
firm and 589 observations for non-distressed firm are used as the sample. The firms are match 
based on size as measured by total assets, and industrial classification, as categorized by Bursa 
Malaysia. Matching is done at the end of 2004.      
To investigate whether governance characteristics influence the occurrence of distress, a 
multiperiod logistic regression model of the following form is estimated: 
    Pi =    
where Z is the linear combination  
Zit = α0 + β1 X1 it + β  2X2it + β  3X3it +………..+ β  nXnit  
 
It can also be written as follows: 
Zit = α0 + β1 LNBSIZEit + β  2FINEDit + β  3FNINEDit + β  4FEXECDIRit + β5D4CEOCHAIR+  
β6 CEOFOUND+ β7LAGMKTRETit + β8D4MKTRET it +  β9GDPt + β10LEVERAGEit + 
β11NI2TAit+ ε t 
 
Where i refers to firm, t refers to time, and  
Pi :A binary variable that equals to 1 for distress, zero otherwise 
LNBSIZE :The number of directors on the board  
FINED :Proportion of independent directors to total directors  
FNINED : Proportion of non-independent non-executive directors to total directors  
FEXECDIR : Proportion of executive directors to total directors 
D4CEOCHAIR : A binary variable that equals to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman 
CEOFOUND : A binary variable that equals to 1 if the CEO is also the founder  
LAGMKTRET : The lagged market return 
D4MKTRET : The market return 
GDP : Gross domestic products 
LEVERAGE : Total debt to total assets 
NI2TA : Net income to total assets 
 





Table 1 summarizes statistics of relevant variables for the two groups of distressed and matching 
firms if distress is identified by using a cut-off point of 25%. Board size, as measured by the 
natural logarithm of the number of directors (LNBSIZE), is smaller for distressed firms compared 
to that of matching firms and it is significant based on either parametric difference-of-two-means 
test or non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test. As a company enters into financial problems, it will 
cut costs. One way of doing this is by reducing employees including directors. Furthermore, a 
company in financial distress may want to expedite its decision making process. A smaller board 
allows that to happen.  A breakdown of board size into three categories of independent directors 
(INED), non-executive non-independent directors (NINED) and executive directors (EXECDIR) 
shows that the number of independent directors does not change as the p-values for both tests are 
not significant. However, the number of non-executive non-independent directors and executive 
directors are lower for distressed firms. When ratios of independent (FINED), non-executive non-
independent (FNINED), and executive (FEXECDIR) are used, it is found that FINED is greater 
in distressed firms. This result suggests that independent directors could give a more objective 
assessment of a distressed firm’s conditions and they are being relied upon to resolve financial 
problems of the firm. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that the ratio of executive 
directors in a distressed firm is lower compared to that of a matching firm. 
 
CEO-chairman duality (D4CEO-CHAIR) is significantly higher in distressed firms (22.24%) as 
compared to that in matching firms (17.73%). As distressed firms must be more agile in decision 
making, uniting the two functions (CEO and chairman) would lead to speedier actions. On the 
other hand, it could also be argued that it is that by having duality the CEO would become more 
powerful and more autocratic. This might lead to problems.  
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for and differences between distressed and matching firms 
 










LNBSIZE 1.84795 1.99044 0.000 0.000 
INED 3.04075 3.12909 0.153 0.115 
NINED 1.23430 1.43029 0.012 0.011 
EXECDIR 2.33107 2.98279 0.000 0.000 
FINED 0.47025 0.41854 0.000 0.000 
FNINED 0.17850 0.18945 0.278 0.249 
FEXECDIR 0.35206 0.39193 0.000 0.000 
D4CEO-Chair 0.22241 0.17728 0.054 0.054 
D4CEO-Found 0.09338 0.20482 0.000 0.000 
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LagMktRet 0.06839 0.07100 0.851 0.984 
MktRet 0.08255 0.08076 0.907 0.876 
GDP 0.04832 0.04861 0.849 0.984 
Leverage 0.71118 0.20865 0.000 0.000 
NI2TA -0.10111 0.03222 0.052 0.000 
 
CEO-founder (D4CEO-FOUND) is significantly lower in distressed firms (9.34%) as compared 
to that in matching firms (20.48%). It could be argued that founder who served as CEO would 
significantly improved the performance of the firms as he is personally attached to the firm and 
considered the firm as his crowning achievement. Therefore, he would work hard to make sure 
that the firm survive and thrive. On the other hand, if a firm starts showing signs of distress, the 
founder might relinquish his post as CEO.  
 
As for financial variables, it is found that the financial position of matching firms is significantly 
superior to those of distressed firms. Leverage (LEVERAGE) is higher for distressed firms while 




Table 2 describes the correlation between the variables. Gujarati (2003) suggests that correlation 
above 0.5 might lead to multicollinearity problem. All correlation are less than 0.5 except 
between FNINED and FEXECDIR (-0.709), LAGMKTRET and MKTRET (-0.567) and 
LAGMKTRET and GDP (0.902). In subsequent regression analyses, these correlations are taken 
into consideration by dropping the highly correlated variables. 
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Regression analysis  
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of logit analysis. Model 1 summarizes the results of governance 
variables. The results show that distress firms have smaller board (LNBSIZE). Smaller board 
leads to faster decision making, which is crucial to firms facing financial difficulties. 
Furthermore, expenses could be reduced by decreasing board member.   Fraction of independent 
director (FINED) explains distress positively and the coefficient is significant at 5%. To solve 
financial difficulties problem, distress firm would tend to hire outside party with more objective 
view of the problem. In this case the firm would hire independent directors. In addition, distress 
firms might terminate the employment of non-performing top management including executive 
directors. Thus, the fraction of independent director would go up. 
 
D4CEOCHAIR is positively significant at 5%. There are two opposing arguments on the effects 
of CEO duality on distress. One argument based on agency theory is that it would increase the 
likelihood of distress as the same person has the ultimate power for decision making of the 
company. Furthermore, it is going to be very difficult to remove the underperforming CEO as he 
also serves as the chairman of the board. The other argument based on stewardship theory states 
that CEO duality would expedite decision making process. The results of this study support the 
arguments of agency theory which is in line with the recommendation of MCCG 2007.  
However, the positive sign might also indicate that as distressed firms have to speed up their 
decision making process, CEO duality is valuable to this firm, which is consistent with the 
stewardship theory. 
 
Table 3. Regression results for all models 
 
                   MODEL 1 
              
MODEL 2 
d4distress  Coef. (P-value) 
Coef. 
(P-value) 




FINED 3.328 (0.040) 
4.071 
(0.060) 
FNINED 1.263 (0.415) 
2.472 
(0.233) 
FEXECDIR 2.311 (0.144) 
3.298 
(0.117) 
D4CEOCHAIR 0.385 (0.029) 
0.185 
(0.293) 
D4CEOFOUND -0.569 (0.006) 
-0.686 
(0.001) 
LAGMKTRET  0.900 (0.502) 
MKTRET  0.274 (0.610) 
GDP  -9.592 (0.366) 
LEVERAGE  4.264 (0.000) 
NI2TA  0.141 (0.009) 
Constant 1.328 (0.428) 
-1.312 
(0.562) 
P-value) 174.63 (0.000) 
294.05  
(0.000) 
















D4CEOFOUND is negatively significant in explaining the likelihood of distress. The significant 
negative relationship between D4CEOFOUND and distress shows that since founders are 
personally attached to their firms they have greater incentives in ensuring the survival of the 
firms. Model 1 correctly classified distress and matching firms 67.89%. 
 
Model 2 extends the previous model by including control variables. When control variables are 
added, results of governance variables do not change except for D4CEOCHAIR where it is not 
significant any more. As for market and economics variable (LAGMKTRET, MKTRET, and 
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GDP), they are not significant. LEVERAGE has the expected positive sign while NI2TA has an 
unexpected positive sign.  
 
Conclusion 
This study examines the influence of corporate governance attributes in predicting financial 
distress.  Attributes that are included in this study are board size, proportions of different types 
of directors (independent, non independent non executive, and executive), CEO duality and 
CEO-founder while the control variables are market return, lag of market return, GDP, leverage 
and net income to total asset.  
 
Sample selection process from 2004 to 2009 resulted in a total of 589 observations of distress 
firms. Equal number of control firms is identified based on size and industry. This process 
resulted in 1170 firm-years observations. Both univariate tests and the multiperiod logistic 
regression models are applied to test whether the variables chosen explained the incidence of 
distress. 
 
The results show that board size and CEO founder is negatively related to the probability of 
distress. The significant negative relationship between CEO founder and distress shows that 
since founders are personally attached to their firms they have greater incentives in ensuring the 
survival of the firms. On the other hand, fraction of independent directors and CEO duality 
explain distress positively. The study also shows that the market and economic variables did not 
play any role in explaining the probability of distress. 
 
Since empirical research on the effects of corporate governance and financial distress is still 
limited in Malaysia, it could be explored further. One suggestion is to look at the effects of 
directors’ education and qualification on distress. The role of audit committee could also be 
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